Incomplete contracts and earnings management by 刘启亮
学校编码：10384                        分类号_______密级 ______ 
学号：B200311004                                    UDC _______ 
 
 
博  士  学  位  论  文 
不完全契约与盈余管理 
Incomplete Contracts and Earnings Management 
刘 启 亮 
指导教师姓名： 陈 汉 文 教授
专 业 名 称： 会 计 学
论文提交日期： 2 0 0 6 年 4 月
论文答辩日期： 2 0 0 6 年 6 月
学位授予日期： 2 0 0 6 年    月
 
 
答辩委员会主席：           
评    阅    人：           
 
 

























                     声明人（签名）： 

























  1、保密（  ），在   年解密后适用本授权书。 




作者签名：      日期：  年 月 日 



















































































Based on the incomplete-contract theory, this paper reconstructs a framework of 
contract-enforcement by extending ‘self-enforcing scope’ and re-explaining ‘vertical 
integration’ theories. The integration relations among accounting law, accounting 
technology norms and accountants’ sincerity are discussed on the basis of dual values 
of accounting institutions as public contracts. Then contract-enforcement theory of 
accounting is raised. Furthermore, the author applies the contract-enforcement theory 
into accounting to discuss the nature of earnings management（EM）, why earnings 
management exists and its essence. The following arguments are then developed. 
Firstly, the accounting information after EM is still true. Secondly, the reason why 
earning management exists is that self-enforcing scope of individual transactor is 
smaller than expected on the market, i.e. the lack of trust performing of individual 
transactor in case there exist some public domains of accounting technology norms as 
public contract. Thirdly, earnings management is actually a kind of rent-seeking game 
among managers, CPA firms and controlling shareholders et al.. Then, this paper 
provides some empirical evidences of EM based on rent-seeking argument from 
perspectives of client importance and audit tenure. Finally, this paper puts forward 
some proposals to restraining earnings management. 
The main innovations of this paper are presented as follows. Firstly, by extending 
‘self-enforcing scope’ and re-explaining ‘vertical integration’, this paper sets up a 
framework of contract-enforcement and applies it into accounting. Secondly, the 
author regards accounting system as a dual-value system which aims at both social 
justness and individual firm’s operation efficiency. Thirdly, by decomposing 
accounting standards and accounting events, this paper innovatively develops an 
allocation pattern of accounting standards for accounting events and analyzes the 
nature and causes of EM. Forth, based on the contract-enforcement theory and game 
theory, the author analyzes the rent-seeking essence for EM. Finally, in the empirical 
section, the author discovers an interesting phenomenon that auditors can constraint 
earnings-decreasing EM, but cannot constraint earnings-increasing EM, which is 
different from previous findings. 
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